Vol. XX, Tab 57 - Ex. 1 - Transcript of Motions Hearing by United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
Santa Clara Law
Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Rosetta Stone v. Google ( Joint Appendix) Research Projects and Empirical Data
2-4-2010
Vol. XX, Tab 57 - Ex. 1 - Transcript of Motions
Hearing
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/appendix
Part of the Computer Law Commons, Evidence Commons, Intellectual Property Commons, and
the Internet Law Commons
This Other Court Documents is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Projects and Empirical Data at Santa Clara Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Rosetta Stone v. Google ( Joint Appendix) by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Automated Citation
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, "Vol. XX, Tab 57 - Ex. 1 - Transcript of Motions Hearing" (2010).
Rosetta Stone v. Google (Joint Appendix). Paper 140.
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/appendix/140
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COORT FOR THE 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 
~ley.andria Division 
ROSETTA STONE, LTD., 
Plaintiff I Civil No. 09 - 736 
VS . February 4, 2010 
GOOGLE, . INC. , 
BEfORE: 
.n.PPEARANCES: 
Defendant. 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
HOTIONS HEARING 
THE HONORABLE THERESA aUCHANAN 
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: SKADDEN ARPS SLATE MEAGHER & FLOM 
BY: ~'JARREN THOMAS ALLEN, ESQ. 
JENNIFER LYNN SPAZTANO, ESQ. 
CLIFFORD MYER SLOAN, ESQ. 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: QUINN , EMANUEL, URQUHART OLIVER 
BY: MARGARET CARUSO, ES Q. 
ODIN FEKLMAN & PIODLEMAN 
BY: JONATHAN FRIEDEN, ESQ. 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER: RENECIA P .. SMITH- vlILSON , Rt>1R 
U . S. District Court 
~Ol Courthouse Square 
Alexandria, VA 22314 
(703)501-1580 
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1 
2 
1 (Thereupon, the following was hea~d in open 
2 COllr't at 2~OO p.~.) 
3 THE CLRRK: Rosetta Stone versus Google, 
4 civi l action 09cv736. 
5 THE COURT: Good morning. 
:.': 6 I1R. F-.LLEN: Good morning, Your Honor. 
7 Warren PO.1Ien on behalf of plaintiff, RosEt:ta Stone. I'm 
8 here with Jennifer Spaziano and Clifford Sloan irom ' 
9 Skadden Arps . 
. : : 
I . · ' 10 THE COURT: All righ t, good morning. 
11 HR.. ALLEN : Ms. Spaz i ano \ ... i1 1 be arguing. 
12 THE COURT: Good morning. 
13 MS. CARUSO: Hi, Your Honor. I'm Margaret 
Caruso from Quinn, Emanuel, Utquhart, Oliver & Hedges 
15 for Google, Inc, the de fendant. 
16 THE COURT; That's all right. Good morning. 
17 ~'S. CARU SO; And this is Mr~ Jonathan 
r· o ' 
18 Frieden. 
19 THE COURT: All right. Thank you all for 
20 coming in today, but I won1t be here tomorrow. Ilve got 
21 an 8 a.m. f l ight 1: 0 Florida. Ha, ha, he.. So, hope I 
22 make it. Not to rub it in, but anyway, lIve read 
23 eVerything, End I've read all of the discovery requests. 
24 00 you have anything to add to your motion 
25 to compel? 
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2 
HS. SPAZIANO: Yes, Your Honor. 
Jen Spaziano on behclf of plaintiff, the 
3 movant, Rosetta Stone. 
4 
5 
6 
You've read all the pleadings --
THE COURT: I have . 
~!S. SP.~ZIANO: You can basically see that we 
1 have reached agreement on a lot of the document requests 
8 t.hat were at issue in the opening brief. 
9 But, that there's really an impasse between 
10 the parties with respect to what's left in issue and I 
11 think irrespective of the number of requests that remain 
12 outstanding, it really boils down t.o one thing ."hich is 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
whether Google made the pool from discovery in this case 
documents relating to simila.r issues raised regarding 
Google's advertising program. Thatls really the 
question that we're addressing here today_ 
And for many reasons, the simple answer to 
16 the question is no. 
19 I've got some background that I'm happy to 
20 tell you about regarding Rosetta Stone and what it does 
21 and ho\.; important its marks are to it. 
22 
23 
It's the leader in language education 
United States. And it owns numerous federally 
in the 
24 registered trademarks that it has wor~ed very hard to 
25 m~rket. end protect. 
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3 
4 
1 THE COURT: And, Ilm aware of that. 
2 MS, SnZIANO: I know you are. You hear 
3 Rosetta Stone, you kno~ ~hat it means. 
4 THE COURT: Right, 
5 MS. SPAZIF.NO: It doesn't mean the arti:act, 
6 It means the language learning software. And you kno ...... 
i , -. Coogle. Goog le operates the Internet search engine. 
! ' 
I. a And what's at issue here is their sale of 
[' 9 advertisements -- their sale of trademarks for the 
! ", 10 advertisement. 
11 THE COURT: Right. 
12 MS. SPAZIANO; Basically, Google takes the 
13 position here that es~entially in fo~mation arising or 
14 discussed or communications, documents ~elating to 
15 either litigation involving Google's practice of selling 
16 trademarks or challenges that don't rise to the level of 
17 litigation where somebody writes them a letter, a cease 
18 and desist letter or asks them not to sell their 
19 trademar k, not information that welre entitled to 
20 discover. 
21 And they base that position on the argument 
22 that this involves likelihood of confusion and whether 
23 Google's practices resulted in c likelihood of confusion 
24 with respect to other trademarks is not relevant to the 
25 question of whether Google!s practices results in 
6659 
1 likelihood . of confus io n with respect to Rosetta Stone's 
2 trademarks . 
3 And focusing on this very narrow issu~ of 
4 customer c onfusion, Google asked the Court basically to 
5 ign ore the forest for the trees. Documents relating to 
6 other challenges to Google's practices are not going to 
7 address only the par.ticular rr.arks at issue in those 
8 cases, the tr:ees that Google asks the Court to focus on. 
g They al~o will address Google's advertising practices 
10 generally, the fores t thatls real ly at issue in this 
11 case. 
12 THE COORT: I do have a couple of specific 
13 ·questions if I could. 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
MS. SPAZIANO: Please. 
THE COURT: Requests number five and 113 
concern me because the apparent breadth of the request, 
and I'm not quite sure what you're aiming for in those 
requests . 
could you explain those to me and why you 
need such -- or have you thought about narrowing that 
those two requests? 
MS. SPAZIANO: The issue of n~rrowing the 
requests I think is something tha t we're willing to work 
with Google on . r think the parties have worked 
25 actually quite effectively --
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5 
6 
1 THE COURT: Well , have you talked about 
2 thesE twe reques~s specifically in terms of na rrowing 
3 them? 
NS. SPAZIANO: In -- the answer is I have 
5 not because we just got involved in the case rece ntly. 
6 THE COURT: Uh-huh . 
7 MS. SPAZIANO: My understanding is that 
8 there have been discussions with respect to narrowing 
... 9 the requests and that the parties have worked rather 
10 well in narroHing requests. 
11 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
12 t·IS. SPAZU.NO: But the concern here is that 
13 Google has simply taken the_ blanket position that --
14 THE COURT: I understand that, but I 'm 
15 trying to figure out is -- because my specific concern 
16 with regard to five and 113 is that I think by looking 
11 at them that they're ~oo broad. 
. , 18 MS . SPAZIANO: They're too broad. 
19 THE COURT: Eve n i f I were to grant them to 
20 you, they seem broad to me. And 1'm trying to find ou~ 
21 ..... hat i't is you wantl r eal ly "'rant in five and 113 . 
22 t.jS. S PAZIJ\NO; Sure. What we1re looking for 
23 are communications between Google and its customers. 
24 THE COURT: Now when you say c;ustomers , you 
25 mean paying customers? 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
. 5 
6 
7 
["IS. 5 PAZ lANO: Ne mean - -
THE COURT: Advercise r s. 
1-\5. SPp.ZIANO: 
what we're looking for 
- - advertisers, exactly. An d 
THE COURT: And then you say or with users 
of their Internet search engine . 
HS. SPAZIANO: !f a customer, if a user, you 
8 or me --
9 
10 
11 compla i ns 
THE COURT: Righ t. 
HS . SPAZIANO; -- who runs c he Google search 
about the advertisements , word is sent , a note 
12 to Google saying I don ' t understand how you ' re ad 
13 what it means for something to be a sponsored ad. 
So users could communicate with Google in a 
15 way t h a t could give ri5e to c ommunications that a r e 
16 r.elevant to th e claims a t issue in this case. 
17 
18 
THE COURT : Well , except the way you worded 
this is not s o clear or specifi c . It says r e l a ting to 
19 the sale -- just: generally . 
20 
22 
!1S . SPAZIANO: Sure . 
THE COURT: Relating to the sale , marketing, 
22 p r omot i on, offering, deSignatio n, use or inclusion of 
23 the t r adem2rks. 
24 
25 
Tha t' s awfully still broa d, I t hink. 
!1S. SPAZIANO: Br oad for you. ~ihat we' r e 
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7 
1 trying to get at through this request are basically 
2 communications t~at Gocgle received frem its advertisers 
3 or from users that basicel1y question or raise issues 
4 with respect to the use cf trademarks in sponsored ads. 
5 So, for example , if a -- if I were to sent 
6 an e-mail to Google that says I just searched for 
7 Rosett.a Sto:1e, and I ,",' 2S brought to a websit.e that I 
8 purchased pi:!:ate 5cftware on, and I don't understand' how 
9 that could have happened because I thought I was getting 
10 to a Rosetta Stone site. 
11 That I 5 the type of --
12 THE COURT: t'1ell, is your question really as 
13 far as users are concerned relating to confusion and 
14 spon~ored ad s? 
15 MS. SPAZIANO: ~elat 1 ng to confusion and 
16 sponsored ads but not specifically the Rosetta Stone 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
mark. 
THE COUR1': Okay. 
MS. SPAZIANO: The idea that Google's 
practice of using trademarks in sponsored ads createe 
confusion . 
THE COURT: Okay. And in regards co 113, do 
you have any reason to believe that there i~ a Iankings 
that l s already created by Google or is this something 
that you're asking them to create? 
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, 
1 
2 
3 
HS . SPAZIANO: In request number~ 107 to 
112 , there were ~equests that certain information be 
created. And on this one, quite frankly, r'm going to 
have to look to Margaret for some assistance in why it 
5 is that 107 to 112 are off the ~able bu~ 113 remains on 
6 the table, as I was not involved in those discussions 
7 
a 
9 
10 
11 
and 113 builds on 107 to 112. 
THE COURT: Well, let me ' look back at those 
because I really wasn't focusing on those. 
second. 
Hold on a 
HS. SPAZIANO: May I invite Ms. Caruso to 
12 try to respond to that tc help us? 
13 THE COURT: Sure. 
14 [>1S . CARUSO: "7e11, I car-,'t explain why 113 
15 remains on the table, but I can say that 101 and 112 
16 Rosetta Stone's prior counsel agreed to withdraw on the 
17 grounds that those were overly burdensome because they 
18 would require Google to 
THE COURT: Okay. 19 
20 
21 
MS. CARUSO: create because these --
THE: COURT, So, is i13 -- does Google have 
22 any kind of document that already exists: 
23 MS. CAROSO: No, Your Honor. It would have 
24 to create all of those multiple, multiple documents. 
25 THE COURT: Okay, all right. Then let me go 
666~ 
9 
h::: 
10 
1 bcck to Google -- r mean Rosetta Stone. 
2 All ~ight. And wha t cemperal limits have 
3 ag=eed tc? Is it back to 2002 with regard to all of 
your requests? 
HS. Si?AZIANO: I believe that Google has 
agreed to prcduce back to 2004. Our position is tha t 
5 
6 
7 
8 
we·re entitled to documents that go back further than 
that because obviou$ly, documents outside the 5tatute of 
9 limitations would be relevant to documents within the 
10 statute of limitations ~ 
11 My understanding is that there have been 
12 certain categories of documents with res pect to which 
13 Google has agreed to produce documents predating 2004 1 
14 presumably in recognition of the position that those 
15 documents do, in fact, beat" on issues occurring during 
16 the relevant timeframe, the s~atute of limitations 
17 time frame . 
18 So, our position is that to the extent t hat 
19 documents are discoverable with respect to particular 
20 topics, challenges to the add words program, litigation 
21 involving the add words program, we would be entitleQ to 
22 
23 
24 
25 
documents that predate 2004 as well. 
THE COURT: Okay. And, what about the 
settlement ag=eements? I really don·t kn~w what those 
would show, I meant or prove. Settlement Egreements 
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1 involve 50 many factors. 
HS. $PAZIANO: They do involve so many 2 
3 
.I-
fac::tors. But the issue is that we don't know what they 
4 say, and that's the struggle for being in the position 
5 of asking for dOCLlments. 
6 I can look at the fact that there'~ been a 
7 litigation and I can say, we ll, your depositions are 
8 certainly going to have information and inte rrogc. tories 
9 are certainly going to be information, and request for 
10 admissions are certainly going to have info rma tion. 
11 Expert reports are certainly going to have information. 
12 I don't kno"'l what --
11 
13 THE COURT: What kind of useable information 
14 would you have from a settlen.tent agreement, though? 
15 
16 
17 
16 
19 
20 
21 
22 
[,15. SPAZIANO: Whereas clause, whereas 
Google --
THE COURT: Nhereas Google does not admit 
liability. 
'IS. SPAZIANO: t~ell --
THE COURT: I mean I guarantee y ou that's in 
there , so are you 
HS. SPAZ!IINO: That's cssuming that that's 
23 what it says. 
2q 
25 
TH E COURT: Right. 
t1S. S?AZIANO: I mean you guarantee me that 
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1 
2 
3 
it's in there . I suspect that it's in there. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MS. SPAZIANO: But taking it on face value 
~ that in there~ but not asking fo!: the documents that 
5 could contain a damning admission that 's relevant to 
6 ..... ha·t they say. Or it could be :n the relief that's 
12 
1 requested, they demonstrate that they can engage in some 
8 kind of a practice that would, you k n ow, stop the 
9 trademark infringement and still allow fo r certain, you 
10 kno\<I/ certain practices to continue without trademark 
11 
12 
13 
infringement. I don't know what's in them. 
THE COORT: Okay. 
MS . SPAZIANO: I understand the fact tha t if 
14 there are standard settlement agreement that just denie~ 
15 all liability and agrees on some kind OI a settlement 
16 payment and results, it might not have information, but 
17 it very "'ell could. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. 
19 MS. SPAZIANO: hnd it is reasonably likely 
20 to lead to the discoverable of admissible evidence . 
21 
22 
23 
Tf.E COURT: 
counsel for GoogJe. 
MS. CARUSO: 
Ail righ t: Let me hear from 
Thank you, Your Honor. I'd 
2q like to pick up with the settlement agree~ent point 
25 because I think it's illuminating on a number of th6se 
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13 
1 issues . 
2 Even if the settle~ent agreements did say 
3 the very unlikely event they said whereas Google admits 
4 infringement, Rule 4:08 tells us that's not admissible to 
5 prove infringement. 
6 
7 
,HE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MS. CARUSO: And given that it's n o t 
8 adrr,issible to prove infringement, it has no relevance on 
9 the issue of intent. lmd we cited a case on page eleven 
10 of our opening brief. It ' s a - -
11 THE COURT: Ilm satisfied as to those - -
12 
13 
MS. CARUSO: Okay. 
THE COURT: - - as to the settlement 
III agreement, so why don't you address any other issue 
15 
16 
you ' d like. 
17 there--
19 
19 
MS. CARUSO: Sure . I ' ll continue on from 
THE COORT: Uh - huh . 
MS. CARUSO: -- because it raises the same 
20 types of iS5ues. All of the -- any. one cease and desist 
21 letters, any e - mail that we've gott.en from a third part).' 
22 saying Google, we don't like your policy, any cons\]mer 
23 who said Google, I bought this product from a website 
24 that was advertised on your site and I don't like it. 
25 It's not \,'hat I thought it '.,Iould be, all of those in 
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2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
a 
9 
" 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
2S 
14 
order to be relevant to the issue of intent which is 
what Rosetta Stone has identified are only going to be 
relevant to the extent that those prove or there's proof 
that there was infringement. And there's no proof here 
that there was ever infringement. Google has never been 
held liable for infringing trademarks in any 
circumstances, especially the advertising circumstancE . 
And so, this would require trials and I 
can't say mini trials because they would be just as 
expensive on this trial . on every single one of these 
things. And it's just going to take us -- really divert 
us from the limited time we have left i n discovery to 
focus on the iss~es that matter here which are Rosetta 
Stone's trademark~. 
It's important, I think, to understand when 
we say we're not using these third party- type documents 
it doesn't mean they're not getting any general stUdies, 
any general policy, reasoning . any policjes. All of 
these things that Google has done with respect to 
trademark~ generally speaking, it has agreed to provide 
and has provided mostly, still in the pr~cess of 
product ion. 
But, these are very far afield . And I can 
come back to the issue of relevance because I think it 
really -- it's a show stopper. 
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15 
1 But the issue of burden I think is equally a 
2 show stopper. because in order to collect type of 
3 
4 
information they're talking about, there iz no 
formulated Search. There 's not even a list of 
5 trademarks to look for. 
6 We would have to -- Goog!e would have to 
1 manually review all of the documents a t a mini~urn in its 
8 Trax database which keeps all communications with 
9 
10 
11 
12 
advertisers and with consumers about advertising. ,Il.nd 
~hose -- those databases contains ten terabytes of data. 
THE COORT: How are they collated or 
categorized? I mean, i t isn't just all dumped in there 
13 together \-lith no organization, is it? 
14 
15 
16 
17 
1-15. CP.RUSO: I don't think so. If you 
looked by advertiser, advertising campaign 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MS. CARUSO : -- you can kind of go into it 
18 that way. 
19 
20 
THE COURT: 
HS. CARUSO: 
Uh -huh. 
But, theI:e's nothing about 
21 their request that enables it to be narrowed in that 
22 
23 
24 
25 
way. \'~e have given them -- we've searched the v:hole 
thing for anything with Rosetta Stone in it. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MS. CARUSO: Thc~ -- they have all of that. 
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16 
THE COURT : Uh-huh. 1 
2 MS. ~ARUSO: " But, you know , in terms of some 
3 customer saying I purchased what I thought was a Nike 
4 shoe and it's not a Nike shoe, what are the search terms 
5 that ",e can use to find that e - mail? 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
THE COURT: SO , the only thing they r re 
organized as to is marketing campaigns? 
r-rs. CARUSO: The advertiser -- you can look 
by advertiser and then you can looy. by their advertising 
ID number and then by -t:heir sub c ampaigns because 
11 advertisers run -- Amazon, for example, runs numerous 
12 di!'.ferent campaigns at any given point in timE. 
13 
14 
15 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. CAROSO : So, on this issue of, 
all these communications with third parties and 
you know, 
16 communications with consumers, ten terabytes of data, 
17 it's something that's really hard to even conceive of, 
18 but I'm told that it would equivalent -- come out to 
19 greater than tWo billion pages of text which if you 
20 assumed one second to review everyone of those pages 
21 would take someone 74 years, 24/7 review_ 
22 vIe certainly don't think that whatever 
23 relevance they may have justifies that burden. 
24 THE COURT: But, vlould that r~late just to 
25 request number five? 
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tiS. CARUSO: Request number five is not the 
only one. 
THE COURT: -- or is that -- would it be ten 
as well? 
gS. CARUSO: Ten is one that's very broad. 
It would require the sam~ thing. 23, the same thing. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
79 also ~ould go to that seme Extent. They're extremely 
broad in calling for al l 
THE COURT: 23 is g~idelines and policies, 
10 not letters of complai .nt. 
11 MS. CARUSO: 23. It's -- if I recall 
12 cort::ectlYr I just --
13 THE COURT: Actually, ten would not relate 
14 because that's really just with regard to third parties 
15 whose trademarks are used, nct just general consumers. 
16 I don't see anything else that would relate 
17 to consumer letters. 
18 MS. CARUSO: Well, thi~ one reads all 
19 documents relat i ng to any Google policies relating to 
20 the sal~, marketing, promotion, offering, deSignation, 
21 use or inclusion of trademarks owned by third parties is 
22 the key words. 
23 So if we just stop rignt there, I'd be 
24 surprised if Rosetta Stone takes the posi~ion that, for 
2S example, a consumer's statement, Google, your trademark 
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18 
1 policy winds up with me but --
2 THE COURT: Well, what are we talking about 
3 if we delet.e the consumer letters? 
4 MS . CARUSO: We're still talking about a 
5 whole lot of trouble because trademarks owned by third 
6 parties as key words is not a separate and defined 
7 category ~ithin Google. We don't have a list ~f those 
a things. ~le don't have 
n 9 THE COURT: You rnear. to tell me that the 
10 consumer who complains -about what they got linked to 
11 when they clicked on Google is kept with the same 
12 letters from a corporation that complains about how 
13 you're using its trademark? 
HS. CARUSO: It depends on whet exactly that 
15 letter from the corporation says, but in some instances, 
16 yes. 
17 THE COURT: Well, how would they normally be 
18 kept if it's a --
19 I.oiS. CARUSO: So a 
20 THE COURT: -- big letter from a big company? 
.. : 21 r-1S. C;'>.RUSO: Is -- a letter that raises a 
I : 22 violation of Google's trademark policies 
23 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
, . 
1<5. CARUSO: -- would be kept.in one place . 
25 And that would be, for example, under a Google's current 
6673 
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1 policy if someone said so - - you know , par t y X is 
2 advertising and my tradema r k name shows up in the text 
3 of their advertisement. 
TH E COURT: Uh-hu h . 
t--'S. CP.RUSO: And they'r-€ not an authorized 
6 reseller and they're not a third party opinion s i te . 
1 They don ' t fit into the terms of what Google says you 
8 can use my 
9 
10 
11 the ad. 
12 
THE COURT: Uh-huh . 
MS .• CARUSO: -- trademark for in a tey.t of 
If that is the compleint , then it \.,rould go 
13 to Google's trademark team and be processed as a 
14 trademark comp l aint, and it , would be' in that batch of 
15 documents. 
15 
17 
THE COURT: Uh - huh. 
MS. C~RUSO: -- which is a larg~ batch of 
18 documents. But letters that say, it looks like this 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
person is bidding on my 
THE COURT: 
MS. CARUSO: 
THE COURT: 
MS. CAROSO: 
key word and I don't like - -
This person is doing what? 
Bidding. 
Oh. 
Trying to have their ad 
19 
24 displayed in response to that tradema rk being entered as 
25 a search query, then those v:ould - - those don't violat~ 
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20 
1 Googlels current trademark policy and wouldn't go to 
2 that datcbase grpup. They would remain in the general 
3 Trax database. 
THE COURT; So, it sounds as though YO!J. have 
5 easier access to things that are not in the Trax 
6 database? 
7 !-is. CARUSO: I - - there are fewer things, 
" B but still a very l~rge magnitude of things in terms of 
, , 9 those types o~ complaints. 
, 
i. 10 And, again; that doesn't seem to me to be 
11 what Rosetta Stone is looking for, or certainly not the 
12 limi t of wha t they f re looking for. 
13 Again, 11m just talking about complaints 
14 that others are in violation ~f Google's trademark 
15 policies. 
16 THE .COURT: But, what if they're no~ saying 
11 it's Google's trademar k policy that I'm complaining 
18 about, just complaining about wha.t I perceive to be your 
19 infr i ngement of my trademark . Does that go into this 
20 trademark policy? Where does that go, legal counsel's 
21 office? 
22 MS. CARUSO: That -- it's filEd in this 
23 general database. And 
24 THE COURT: Tray.. 
25 HS. CARUSO: Yes, in T::ax. 
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1 THE COURT: But is it also filed somewhere 
2 else then? 
3 MS. CP.RUSO: Not that I'm aware of, Your 
4 Honor and I've spoken to Google about this. 
5 THE COURT: Where e lse CQu id such a letter 
6 be filed besides in the trademarks policy g~oup? 
7 MS. CARUSO: I'm not aware of -- such a 
, 
8 letter as you've just described basically saying this 
9 violates my trademark separate and apart from Google's 
10 trademark policies --
11 THE COuRT: Uh-huh. 
12 MS . CARUSO: -- would just remain in Trax 
13 database because --
14 THE COURT: They ~ouldn't go to counsel's 
15 office or this as well? 
16 HS. CARUSO: Google wouldn't take further 
17 action on it because it wouldn't -- it doesn't rise to 
IS the level of something that Google has determined it 
19 will take act ion on. 
20 THE COURT: Well, how does Google deterrni lle 
21 it will take action on something, only if somebody says 
22 it violates Google's tr.ademark policy? 
23 115. CARUSO: t'~ell, they don't have to use 
24 those magic ",ords. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. That's what I'm trying to 
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1 figure out. 
2 I~S . CARUSO, 
3 communication as it comes in and make that 
4: determination. 
5 THE COURT, I see, okay . I understand. 
6 Anything else? 
7 [1S. CARUSO: Yes , Your Honor . So, the 
a trademark infringement and -- the real -- the root issu e 
9 here is going to be likelihood of confusion. And 
10 there I s no ge!1eral holding out there in -the law that the 
11 sale of the use of a tradem.ark as a key word , that i n 
12 and of itself is infringing . 
13 All the cases say you have to look at the 
facts of the case. You have to l ook at who's doing the 
15 advertising, what is the content of the ad, what i3 the 
16 website that it· s linked to. 
17 
18 
And those very drama t ically in the case 
of Rosetta Stone, if you've done a recent search on 
19 them, the main non-Rosetta Stone sponsored link that 
20 5hOl.<1S up is Amazon. com, aT: authorized reseller of 
21 Rosetta Stone_ 
22 Th;::t's very differen:: from if you have 
23 mostly counterfeiters who axe bidding. And of course, 
24 that violatES Google trademark policy and_they would 
25 take those down upon notice, or if you have competitors, 
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1 or if you have par::ies who ara bidding or. the word 
2 because the word .has a separate and independent meaning. 
3 ror example if someone was advertising 
4 British museum tours to see the Rosetta Stcne, or Apple 
5 if someone was bidd ing because they had some other Apple 
6 product not related to the company. 
7 So, to take thcse collectively just doesn't 
a say very much in this case abou~ these facts. 
9 And if what they --
10 
11 
12 
THE COURT: tllell, how is it really? I mean, 
this is a very different type of trademark infringement 
case. And normally you really would be looking at, you 
13 know, ho~' close a violation it :'5 and so forth and 50 
14 on. It would be unique as ' to each particular trademark. 
15 I really don I t see how the trademark holders 
15 in these cases are different from Rosetta SLone . 
17 They'~e not trying to invade the actual trademark in 
IS terms of making something sound similar to Rosetta 
19 Stone. They're -- you're using the name. You're using 
20 ~he Geico name, and you're using the Rosetta Stone name 
21 and the -- you know, I forget who the others were, 
22 American Airlines name specifically when it's put into 
23 t h e search engine to use that to link to advertisers. 
24 So I don ' t know how you have -- there may be 
. 25 to Some degree that they can be differentiated and 
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1 perhaps that would arise when evidence of the other 
2 manufacturer -- ·the othe~ cqmpanies' s t.rademarks might 
3 be introduced into evidence at trial . 
But for discovery purposes, r really don ' t 
5 see h011l' they're very dlffe!:ent. 
6 MS. CARUSO: t'lell, let me talk c.bout that a 
7 little bit . I mean in the Geico case, the Court drew a 
B distinction between links that were just triggered by 
· .~ 9 the key wo!:d whi ch it found no ~roblem with and found 
10 that Google hadn't produced any evidence that consumers 
11 were not confused if it used the name. 
12 THE COURT: Well, that's not necessarily the 
13 case. I've read the opinion , and I really don't think 
14 necessarily it says what you're saying it says or that 
15 it goes as far as you'd like to think it does. But [ 
16 also don't think that it really is relevant to this case 
, . ' 
L . 17 because it was nct an ultimate determin~tion of the 
. J is case. That was just for , you know, injunctive purposes , 
19 and it was settled . 
20 I mean all of these cases have been settled, 
> : 
and I find that very interesting. And I don't think 21 
;" .: 
22 that there' s a definitive opinion on here, and 1 don't 
23 think that you can ~ely . on the Geico case to the extent 
2. that you'd like to. And I think that it'$ not binding 
25 cert~inly on Jucige Lee. So --
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1 MS. CARUSO, I think that 
2 THE COURT: I think we're starting really 
3 from ground ::'ero again r and I cien' t think even Judge 
4 Brinkema would say her opinion in the Geiee case would 
5 necessarily affect the discovery rulings in this case or 
6 any other case . 
7 MS. CAROSO: Well, : think -- what she 
e clearly seid in the opinion was that it was her ruling 
9 which was 
10 THE: COURT, It was confi ned to Geico and the 
11 Geico fact, and they had a problem with their expert 
12 report, clearly. 
13 MS. CAROSO: Right , exactly. And again, she 
14 said it was on the fact s of that case. 
15 
16 
THE COURT: Right. And I donlt think it's 
the S2me thing . I really don't because they h ad a big 
17 problem with their expert report. 
18 MS. CARUSO: Wel l , Your Honor, ! think 
19 therels a big problem with the expert report here l too. 
20 THE COURT: Well, I haven't seen that , yet. 
21 I haven' t seen that yet. 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MS. CARUSO : 
THE: COURT: 
actual confusion. 
MS. CF.RUSO: 
But --
She still f oun d tha t there was 
She found that Gcogle had not 
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1 rebutted it as the use of the name in the ads. 
2 THE COURT: Right, right . 
J ,~s. CARUSO: But that's a distinction right 
there, use of the name in the ad versus not using the 
5 name in the ad. 
6 p.nd the cases all, even though they aren't 
7 the tradit i onal, you know, Starbucks versus Starchuck~ 
6 kind of trademark case, all come down to the same 
9 likelihood of confusion analysis. 
I :' 10 And here, you know, all of these survey 
11 reports and the other cases, t.heyt re different types of 
12 ad ver tisers, different types of advertisements, 
13 different types of natural results that are being loo ked 
" ... 14 at. 
15 And in deposing the plaintiff's expert on 
16 the likelihood of confusion issue, he admitted -- you 
17 can't talk about how things would be with other 
19 different types of advertisements and different types of 
19 natural links because --
20 You're talking about the Geico? THE COURT: 
f'1S . CI'.RU SO: 21 I'm ':'olking .about this Rosetta 
22 Stone's expert. 
23 THE COURT, vJell , I haven't seen that . 
24 MS. CJ>.RUSO : I unde rs tand. 
25 THE COURT, And I don't know how that's 
6681 
1 relevant to the discovery request. 
2 MS. CARUSO: v}ell, it goes to the fact that 
3 ~hatever Google has done with regard to other companies 
4 doesn't have bearing on 'Whether consumers are likEly 
5 to --
THE COURT: 
115. CARUSO: 
DOEsn't it go to willfulness? 
It only goes to willfulness 
6 
7 
8 ther.e is evidence -- if th~re'3 proof of intent like 
if 
9 the--
10 THE COURT: Yeah, well what do they mean to 
27 
11 do when they're using -- I don't understand how you can 
12 say that it's not relevant when what we're talking about 
13 is really the exact same act, someone using -- you using 
14 
15 
16 
the ac t ual trademark of e company. 
MS. CARUSO: Your Honor, I appreciate that. 
THE COURT: P.nd I'm hav ing .trouble. t-iaybe 
17 you think you can con.vince me somehow, go ahead and give 
16 it a try. 
19 l1S. CJl.R'OSO: The likelihood of confusion 
20 factors don't only focus on the similarity of the marks 
21 
22 
23 
2S 
at issue. They also --
THE COURT: 
You're using the mark. 
MS . CARUSO: 
THE COURT: 
There's no similarity of marks. 
That's cor:-ect. 
Okay. 
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1 HS. CARUSO: ~'Jell, it is being used . Their 
2 case goes beyond just --
3 THE COURT: I unde!:stand that , but the main 
4 issue here is you 1 re using their mark.. 
5 t-ss. CARUSO: Right. But that 1 s not the only 
6 factor in likelihood of confusion. There are other 
7 factors--
THE COURT: 
9 HS. CP.RUSO: - - which include the strength 
10 of the mark. 
11 THE: COURT: I'd say it's pretty ~trong. 
12 Let's go ahead. 
13 NS. CARUSO: And there's that one mark that 
14 that Rosetta Stone that's pretty streng. 
· . 15 THE: COURT: Right. 
16 MS. CARUSO: They have other marks like 
17 audio compa~ion. 
18 THE COURT: I know . Let's just deal with 
19 Rosetta Stone for no ..... · . Let's aSSLlme that it's strong. 
20 MS. CARUSO : All right. All these other 
21 complaints that exis t out there, He don't hcve any 
22 evidence about the strength of their marks. So - -
23 THE COORT: American Airlines, or Geico 
24 or - -
25 MS. CARUSO: For cases that actually 
1 existed. So if you want me just to focus on litigation 
2 versus any person's complaint to Google, then I'll do 
3 that. 
THE COURT: Well , I'm not talking about any ~ 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
person. I ' m talking about corporations. 
MS. CARUSO: 
THE COURT: 
~lS. CAP.USO: 
Any company's complaint 
Right . 
- - versus an actual legal 
proceedings . That 's the di~tinction chat I'm saying do 
10 you want me to --
11 
12 
13 
14 
THE COURT: 
the s arne thing. 
MS . CARUSO: 
THE COURT: 
I ' m sorry. I thi n k they ' re all 
Okay. 
And I agree that there might be 
15 some complaints by some companies that perhaps don't 
16 have the same strength as Rosetta Stone or that, but 
11 we're still talking about at least for di.scovery 
29 
18 purposes now and what we put into evidence at trial, hut 
19 we're still tel king about what amounts to the same 
20 issue, that a company complains that they used their 
21 actual trademark. 
22 MS . CARUSO: And, Your Honor ( if you think 
23 about that, think about every comparative advertisement 
24 that exists, they all use the actual trademark . Sut 
25 they don I t all turn out the same way. 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
it 
THE COURT: Uh - huh. 
MS. ·CARUSO: They're ver~' .different because 
depends on the question of confuzion. A.nd so --
THE COURT: Right , exactly. 
r-1s. CARUSO; Take, fer example, Time 
6 Magaz ine has been sued in the P3st for running a 
7 comparative ad that a company said infringed i~s 
B trademark. If it's sued again for running a different 
9 ad, ... 'hat. happened 1.n that first laHsuit is not relevant 
10 to the second lawsuit ', 
11 THE COURT: Okay, I understand . 
12 HS. CARUSO: I think it really is going to 
30 
13 open up, especially on the issue of expert reports. The 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
experts that Google has in this case are not the experts 
that it's had before. The facts that it had in other 
cases are not the facts that we have here. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MS. CARUSO: If we're going to bring those 
19 experts reports in on damages, 1 donlt see how r you 
20 know, what American Airlines' usage was has anything to 
21 do .. <lith what the usage is here in Rosetta Stone. 
22 
23 
2q 
25 
But also on the question of confusion, then 
you really are inviting a wllole new trial of those 
issues that were never tried before. 
THE COURT: Oh-huh. 
66as 
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1 
2 
3 
q 
/·15. CARUSO: Rcsetta Stone didn't bring this 
5 
6 
7 
8 
case as a class action or seek :0 resurrect all those 
past cases. It's just bringing this on its own behalf. 
THE COURT, 
>15. CARUSO, 
Uh - huh . 
And, the volume of these 
documents is quite a lot . 
THE COURT: Okay. 
!-IS. CARUSO: Given -- you know, if they Io.'ant 
9 a stipulation that other people have complained about 
10 Gocgle's trademar~ policy, Google will provide that. 
11 I don't see hoy! having r you kno~, a stack of 
12 complaints without all -- having full trials on ~11 of 
13 them to present to the jury how it is that all of those 
14 aren't rel evant either in addition to this one not 
15 
16 
winding up with confusion. It --
THE COURT, Well, that's interesting . to1ould 
17 Google be willing to stipulate that it had X thousands 
18 of complaints about its t~ademark policy and the way 
19 it's used -- the same issue that Rosetta Stone is 
20 complaining of? ~re you willing to stipulate to that? 
21 MS. CARUSO: Well, not right here, right now 
22 for one reason because I don't know what the extent of 
23 those numbers are because --
THE COURT: Uh- huh. 
25 MS. CARUSO ·, -- it's so burdensome to do. 
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1 We haven't undertaken it. 
2 THE: COURT: I wonder how many you'd be 
3 willing to stipulate to, 
4 11S. CARUSO: For purposes of discovery I we 
5 probably would be willing to stipulate to some number. 
6 I should check with my client as to what they're 
7 
8 
9 
10 
comfortable with on that. 
THE COURT: Okay . Thank you . 
Did you have anything to add? 
MS. SPAZIANO: Just a ccuple of comments if 
11 I might Oil the issue of expe rt reports and the other 
12 litigation and why those documents would be relevant 
13 here or other deposition transcripts. 
14 Let's start with the 30tb} (6) deposit ion. 
15 30(b} (6) deposition of Google in the American Airlines 
16 
17 
18 
case, I don't know if one took place because! don't 
know what was there. 
But if one did, Google testifying about the 
19 practices that are on issue here, clearly relevant . 
20 \'le're going to take a 30(b) (6) deposition of a Google 
21 person. We're entitled to know what Gcogle has said in 
22 the past about these same issues. 
23 The same thing goes for interrog~tory 
24 responses if they exist( request for admission which we 
32 
25 specifically asked for, damages expert reports which was 
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1 something that was specifically ccmmented as can't see 
2 ho,",,' it could possibly be re~evant. 
3 Well, putting aside the separateness of the 
4 mark , the damages that are recovexable in these cases 
5 are very similar . And if Google's expert says in the 
6 American 1'-.irlines case that damages should be A, 8, C or 
1 
8 
9 
D and I don't mean the numbers, 1 mean --
THE COURT: How their calculated, uh-huh. 
t-jS. SPAZIANO: Or they should exclude X or 
10 Y, and Google's exper~ here is taking a very different 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
15 
17 
16 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
position, we're entitled to know that. And what is 
interesting is you've got case ~fter case that has been 
settled as Your Honor noted. And because it's been 
settled , we're not entitled to see that information. 
.lI.nd Google in fact is able , therefore . to -- or 
attempting to try to shelter, you know, that 
discoverable information from U5. 
so, I I bel i eve that all of that 
information could be very relevant to the issues that 
we're dealing with right here as we proceed down the 
path of taking some of these depositions and dealir.g 
with the experts. 
As for the burden argument associated with 
these documents because. Google chooses to . dt.:.mp all of 
it s documents in a Trax system, that's not a basis to 
6688 
--: 
i. 
;..-;1 
34 
1 say you dO!1 't get any of i:: . 
2 And - if that information is relevant to this 
3 case and d i scoverable and we believe for all the reasons 
4 we've talked about today and all the reasons Your Honor 
5 has raise~ it is discoverable, you can ' t just say , YleIl, 
6 it's iti a ten terabyte database and we can't get it. 
7 And such an assertion coming from Google 
8 which is the greatest search engine in the wcrld is even 
9 less -- less realistic. 
10 THE COURT: Okay . 
11 NS. SPP-.ZIANO: So I just raise those points, 
12 and I think that if this information is d i scoverable, 
13 there are mar.y Hays to figure out how to get that 
information without imposing undue burden . 
15 And we all work through those issues on a 
16 daily basis. But to date, we ' ve been told it's not 
11 relevant and it won't be produced. 
18 THE COURT; Okay, thank you very much. 
19 I me a n, 8S I said this is a really unique 
20 sort of trademark infringement case , well, aside from 
21 Geico and Am erican Air lines. 
22 But normally the Cou r t would be pretty 
23 skep t ical of ~equests relating to third pa=ty trademark 
24 infringeme nt . Sut I think to a great extent it' s an 
25 issue in th i s case in terms of willful ness and intent . 
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1 And some of the requests that I think relate to third 
2 
3 
4 
5 
parties are disc6verable, but not everything. 
me just kind of go through this, 
And let 
As fer request number five, I think that 
it's still too broad. If they're going to have to do a 
6 search in the Tray. system, again , I have t.o agree with 
7 defendant's counsel that I don't even know how you g? 
9 about searching for that. 
9 1 f you want to search the Trax system and 
10 thi s actually holds tr~e with regard to anything e lse 
11 that I grant in your mot i on to compel, as far as 
12 because you've already agreed to produce and you have 
35 
13 prcduced everything that's related to Rosetta Stone from 
14 the Trax system. If there's ·anything else that you 
15 wanted out of the Trax system. you're going to have to 
16 pay .for the search. 
17 So if you want number five as you have 
18 defined it orally here du~ing argument, ! don't have a 
19 problem with that if ' the plaintiff pays for the search, 
20 So you have to decide how much it's worth to you. 
21 I\s to numbers 6 -- 6, 7, 10, 12, I'm going 
22 
23 
to grant those as well. I think -- I don't think it's 
burdensome enough to -- too burden~ome, rather, to have 
24 to p ro duce any document~ that a~en't in the Trax system. 
25 So r "m going to grant that, and I think it 
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1 is relevant as to 5, 7, 10 and 12. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
a 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
15 
As to 13, 14, and 15, as I said before, I 
think settlement agreements are just so -- involve so 
many factors . I just don't think that it's going to be 
relevant nor would it be admissible. and I'm going to 
deny that. 
As to 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 
29, 67, 68, 69, 76, 77, 78, 79, 93, and 9 -- excuse me, 
93 and then 106, I'm going to grant all of those. I' ... , 
going to limit it to 2002, go back that far. And as I 
said, if it relates to the Tray. system, I'm not going to 
require them to search that any fUrther. But, 
everything else I think is _reasonably related to 
information here that might be relevant at trial. 
11m going to allow those. 
So 
As to request number 96, I'm not going to 
17 allow the payments again for the same reason I'm not 
18 going to allow the sett.lement c:greement. 
19 And as to request number 13, they've made a 
20 representation they don't h a ve such documents. So I'm. 
21 not going to grant the request with regard to that. 
22 So basica l ly. I'm granting eve~ything except 
23 fo r -- let's go over it again and make sure I've got it 
24 
25 
correct, 
denied. 
except for five. 
14 is denied. 15 
Five is denied: 13 is 
is denied. 96 is denied t and 
1 113 is denied, except as I said to the extent that 
2 plaintiff wants to pay t o 9Q to the Trax system. 
3 Now 
5 
6 
MS . CAROSO: Your Honor --
THE COURT: I 'm sorry, go ahead. 
1<1S . CARUSO: I wan ted to just seek 
37 
7 clarification on one thing. Those requests, encomP2I:ssed 
8 within them is a huge amount of attorne y work product 
9 informat ion. 
10 THE COURT: Well, you're j ust going to have 
11 to file a privilege log with regard to anything that you 
12 claim is privi l ege . I'm not saying that non -- that 
13 p rivil eged documents must he produced. You have to do a 
14 privilEge log . 
15 HS. CAF.OSO: Okay, but privilege log itself 
16 is gcing to be pretty hurdensome going back to 2002 to 
17 collect those things. 
18 THE COURT: ! don't think a lot of this is 
19 privileged. 
20 t-1S . CA.RUSO: vlell, one of these request ell 
21 analysis abo ut, you know, considering remov ing anyth i ng, 
22 all -- all communications relating to the presence or 
23 absence of it , all documents ~elat ing to Google's 
24 polic i es concerning which I think 
25 THE COORT : Uh-huh. 
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1 MS. CARUSO: ?icks up literally every 
2 single document .relating to a lawsuit. And so drafts of 
3 summary judgment briefs and, you kno\", it just is a 
huge amount of --4 
5 THE: COURT: All :eight. Well, tell me which 
6 ones specifically you"re concerned about because I don't 
7 mean it to be quite that far . . You're talking about 18? 
8 
9 
MS . CARUSO: Ie would definitely be one of 
them . 19 and 20 are basically the same except they 
10 changed "removing" to . "limiting'· and "prohibiting ". 
How many suits have you had? 11 
1 2 
THE COURT: 
[.5. CARUSO: It's fewer than ten, but they 
13 do go back fer -- well, I shouldn't say fewer than ten. 
14 I think that it's £ewe~ than " ten . aut they go back 
15 quite some t i me. 
16 And, you know, it - - finding these -- sort 
11 of tracking down the ?rivileged information in order to 
18 log it is going to be a -- quite an undertaking given 
19 the amount of time that has passed in the past eight 
20 years for all of these things that are th€o~etically 
21 responsive . 
22 So ill Your Hono~, you could limit it to 
23 anything ~hat was exchanged, production with counselor 
21, filed with Court or depositions 
25 THE COURT: I don't think we can do that 
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1 becaus~, I mean, it may be p:::ivilegsdi it may not. 
2 t'lelli let ' s see. Number 18 says - - all 
3 
4 
right. r see what you're saying. I guess if it related 
to a lawsuit that if it was not privileged r mean, 
5 well certainly, if you'd communicated to somebody else 
6 that -- to the other party that it would not be 
'I privilEOged. 
8 
9 
l'!S. CARUSO: Right. 
THE COURT: If you did not communicate it, 
10 then I'm assuming tha~ at some point a privilege issue 
11 would have come up with regard to those documents, that 
12 they would hav~ been privileged to begin ''''ith. 
13 
14 
Wouldn't you agree? 
MS. SPAZ!ANO: May I speak to this? One 
15 thing we have talked about is trying to reach an 
16 agreement and not loqging the documents that are clearly 
17 
IS 
privileged . And it'~ one thing that's under 
consideration. We sent a proposal to Google's counsel 
19 that would, you know, not require us to log things that 
20 are clearly privileged 
21 
22 
THE COURT: Right. 
MS. SPP.ZIANO: -- such as tO I you know, 
23 client seeking legal advice o r conveying legal advice. 
24 And so wetr~ happy t o work th~ough that. Ne 
25 have got a proposal o n the table. My concern about the 
6694 
1 concern raised by counsel is she said that it would be 
2 very burdenscme t;.o go back and try to find all of those 
3 things that are privileged. 
4 And what worries me is that if you say you 
40 
5 don't have to log any of those things 1 and they don't go 
6 out and search for th o se things, they may miss things 
7 that are not privile g ed and respon sive. 
a And so I'm happy to work on minimizing the 
9 bu~den of the privileged log because we're not going to 
10 come to in and fight o.ver draft summary judgment briefs 
11 and whether or not they should be produced. 
12 
13 
But I think that the burden to seare)l for 
the document~ needs to exist " The logging is something 
14 that we"' re happy to wor.k through. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
THE COURT; Well, let me ask you something. 
I mean wouldn't mozt -- ! mean, Google doesn't usually 
represent itself . It has outside counsel, correct? 
11S. SPFa.ZIJl.NO: Yes. 
THE COURT; SC r most of what you're 
20 concerned about would b e in the possession of outside 
21 counsel, ;,.·ould it not l not inhouse? 
22 MS. CF.RUSO: Except to the exten ~ that 
23 drafts were sent to inside counsel and e - mails were 
24 exchanged with inside counsel which I bel~eve happens 
25 fairly frequently. 
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1 THE COURT: i~ell, what if -- I mean, what if 
2 we accepted anything that ".:a;s -- you know, I don I t know 
3 how you're going to do this! t.hough. 
4 ~lhat I'm wondex::ing about is general reviews 
5 and analysis rather than ones that are specific to 
6 litigation with regard to 18, 19, and 20, and 21, 22. 
7 
8 
MS. CARUSO: Your Honor, with respect tQ 
general ones that are not specific given litigation , 
9 we've already agreed to produce those. 
10 THE COURT: . Because when I was looking at 
11 those, I was really thinking of general studies not 
12 specific to certain litigation. 
13 HS. CARUSO: Right, and we agreed tha t 
14 that' s relevant, general studies, and that's \-th y He have 
15 agreed to px::oduce them. 
16 THE COURT: Okay, but I am letting them 
11 have -- okay, so why do you think that that would -- let 
18 me ask plaintiff's counsel again why -- I understand 
19 that you think that there might .be something in there. 
20 But if they 're agreeing to give you the general ones and 
21 if they're agreeing to give you the specific documents 
22 that you asked for with regard to American Airlines 
23 and -- let' s see, contrast for somebody else as well. 
24 But you asked specifically 
25 MS . CP.RUSO: Asked specifically for --
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1 HS. SPJlZIJlNO: About America n Airlines, and 
2 th at ' s par t of t·he issue, \.J .E don't know wha t other 
3 litig a tion out there exists or what other resolutions 
4 existed before matte~~ went to litigation . And tha t 's 
5 exactly the issue. 
6 To the extent that there \o/ere communications 
7 like those that were provided in the American Ai rline5 
B litigation that exist with respect to matters that 
9 didn't need litigation, they're likely to have the same 
10 kind of --
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
THE COURT: You've got the America n 
Airlines, thougll, already. I mean, you don't have that. 
I mean I'm telling them to produce it . 
cnything on that . 
MS . SP;t.Z!ANO: Right. 
You don ' t hove 
THE COURT: We're going to have to take this 
17 one step at a time I think . 
IS MS . SPAZlJi.NO: Sure. 
19 
20 
T;{E COURT' You're going to have to p r oduce 
the American Airlines as ! ordered. And I think you 
21 think that was only one that was a specific suit. 
22 Okay. Then. a.s far as lB. 19, 20 , 21, I'm 
23 going to - - and 22, and 23, then! '11 relate t.hat to 
2~ just general analysis and pol i cies and so ' forth, not 
25 specific to specific litigation. 
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1 HS. SPl\ZIANO: Can I ask for one 
2 clarification for ~hat? 
3 THE COURT: Uh- huh. 
MS. SPAZIANO: If there's a litigation or 
5 you know, say like pick Geico because Geico wasn 1 t 
6 specifically mentioned here where there was a general 
'7 analysis and an expert report, is that something that is 
8 being produced or is that being excluded from production 
9 becaus-e it was general analysis in the context of a 
10 specific litigation? That'3 really what --
11 THE COURT: ~ihat I'm asking them -- what I'm 
12 telling them to do is to not have to look into specific 
13 
14 
15 
litigation files. 
MS. SPP.ZIANO: Uh-huh. 
THE COORT: That they ' re going to have -- I 
16 mean if they have a general analysis that - - or reV~iellT 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
that they conducted and perhaps it was sparked by a 
suit, that's fine. But if it's not part of a litigation 
process the~ they don't have to produce it. 
Now, what I think should happen is, you 
should get the American Airlines stuff. And if you 
think that there may be additional specific documents 
23 that you might need from anothe~ specific suit, then 
24 maybe address that. 
25 But I don't think - - you know~ and come beck 
1 and ask me about that. But I don't think! can requ ire 
2 that they go through what I ';n sure are boxes and boxes 
3 of litigation files. 
4 MS . SPAZIANO: Understood. Would it be 
5 possible for them to create a list of those litigation 
6 matters or those challenges that didn't result in 
1 litigation so we could know what exists tha~ we're not 
8 getting so that we could come to you --
9 THE COURT: You're saying they're list than 
10 ten? You just want to knOH" the names of the SUl.ts? Is 
11 that what you're asking me? They're a matter of 
12 public- -
13 MS. SPAZIANO: Well, to the extent that 
14 they're public r we' re aware of them. 
15 THE COURT: Right. 
16 115 . SPAZIANO: Sut to the extent that there 
44 
17 are litigation files before a matte~ goes to litigation, 
18 1 mean , there could very well be and likely are 
19 situations where somebody threatened litigation, and it 
20 was r esolved in light --
21 THE COlJRT: Well, I doubt that any of that 
22 analysis is in there if it never even went to trial , if 
23 it never even wEnt to suit . 
24 MS. SPAZIANO: It would certainly depend on 
25 nOvI those negotiations --
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2 
3 
4 
5 
THE COURT: 
little too deep there. 
Right. I think we're digging a 
I'm going to limit it as I said 
to just general analysis and reviews and then deal with 
the American Airlines and we'll go fro m there, okay. 
Now, as to producing these documents , l.J'han 
45 
6 is Google going to be able to produce them? You should 
1 be able to produce everything up to now already because 
e you said you were going to do that by February -- excuse 
9 me, January 29th or something. 
10 
11 
MS. CARUSO: That was our intent. There are 
a few stragglers out there. Only since making that 
12 correction th ere have been more .requests served en us, 
13 so fewer I think that 200 documents outstanding for us 
14 to ?roduce from vlhat weld already agreed to. 
15 
16 
17 
As far as when we can produce these, I 
frankly don't know. r cen represent that Google will 
work to get it done ~s quickly as possible . But , 
18 searching for all of thi~ could take some time, so I 
19 just think that 
20 
21 
22 
19th, 
THE COURT: What do you think about by the 
a little over two weeks? 
HS. CARUSO: We will certain l y attempt to do 
23 that and make every effort. 
24 THE COURT: P.ll right. Then J'll assume 
25 that you're going to produce them by february 19th and 
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1 1 111 extend discovery a little bit then to deal with 
that. 
I ' m going to keep the final pretrial 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
conference on for February 18th. 
and pick a trial date, okay. 
You'll have to just go 
And then what I ' ll do is give you until --
1 how about. then until, assuming :hey pr:oduced everyth .ing 
a which I'm which I'm strongly encouraging you to 
9 comply with, then let I s have the close of discov e ry by 
10 March 12th, all right: 
11 Then you can excha;1ge your pretrial 
12 submissions by the 24th with objections to the pretrial 
13 
14 
15 
15 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
submissions by the 31st. 
115. SPJl...ZrANO: May I ask one quest i on about 
the Court's ruling with respect to t he Tray. system? 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
IJlS. SPAZIANO: I think your ruling suggested 
that if we Yant the Trax sy~tem to b e searched, we'd 
have to pay for the search and my question - -
THE COURT: B~yond what they ' ve already 
searched for . As I understand they've been all for 
Rosetta Stone searches. 
NS . SPAZIANO: Understood completely. 
24 Hould -- does your orde~ contemplate th2t · we would be 
25 prep~ ring the search that would be done" based on the 
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1 requests that are at issue here such that we can try to 
2 narrow the scope' of that and the cost associated with 
3 that: 
THE COURT: Yes, you can do that. You can 
5 narrow it, and I'd like you all to communicate back and 
6 forth. And if you went to pcy for a limited Trax 
1 search 
EMS. SPhZIANO: Uh-huh. 
9 THE COURT: -- then tha t's all right. 
10 MS. SPAZIANO: Understood . Thank you. 
11 THE COURT; Okay, all right. 
12 Is there anything else that we need to deal 
13 "'ith? No. 
14 
15 
15 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Okay I thank you. - Court I s adj o urned. 
(Proceeding concluded at 2:51 p.m.) 
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